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This study examines the effectiveness of federal student loan allocation and its role in student 
loan default rates. The loan allocation method is represented by program loan limits imposed by 
Congress. In addition to program loan limits, the study considers other educational and economic 
institutional drivers that education research has been linked to student loan default rates. The 
relationship between loan limits, other variables, and default rates is tested through a 
multivariable regression analysis. The analysis suggests that program loan limits do not have a 
significant effect on student loan default rates, but student loans are an effective means to help 
students finance education. To conclude the study, I assess three potential loan allocation 
methods as well as discuss my experience with the study and working with limited public data. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“When  I  entered  college  I  was  sold  a  lot  of  stories about how it was ok to take out loans every 
year because I would get a job that would pay them off. The only problem was that I was 
attending a private school that cost over $40,000 per year. I met my husband there and after we 
finished our undergraduate work, we went on to master's degree hoping to see the economy turn 
around. The only problem is that the economy has not turned around the way we need it to and 
we have built a combined total student debt of over $330,000 including interest. I am currently 
working out of field as a teacher making $30,000 a year and my husband is working part time. In 
a few months debt collectors will start calling for over $3,000 a month in student loan payments. 
The only problem is we only make $2800 a month after taxes and our other living expenses total 
approximately $2,200 a month. This means that we will be unable to pay over $2,400 a month in 
student debt. We don't own anything they can take from us so they will go after our cosigners. We 
can't find anyone who can help us. We have talked to debt consolidation agencies and no one can 
or will help us. We are drowning all because someone sold us up the river with a story about how 
great student loans were and how getting a college education would put us ahead of others. 
Where is this magical educational advantage that everyone likes to talk about because my 
husband has an MBA and is working as a security guard. We need help. How are ever supposed 
to make a life for ourselves? How are we ever supposed to own a home or have children when we 
make a tenth of what we owe in debt? We do take some responsibility for the situation we are in, 
but at the same time, what were our counselors and lenders thinking when they told a couple of 
18 year old college freshman that it was ok to borrow $300,000? How can we possibly get out of 
this?” 
-- Christen Kauffman, Teacher from Florida 
 
 Christen  Kauffman’s  story  represents  one  of 427 first-hand accounts of student 
loan  borrowers’  repayment  struggles.  She  posted  on  The  Project  on  Student Debt’s  web  
forum1 to join the voices of other borrowers frustrated with their student loan debt load. 
Her  story  echoes  the  central  theme  of  all  other  borrowers’  stories—inadequate level of 
income  to  cover  her  student  loan  debt  (“Voices”,  2014). 
 Christen, like other borrowers, blame many players for student loan debt. Players 
include Congress, the executive branch, colleges, and financial institutions. Congress sets 
statutory standards on student aid eligibility standards, types, and amount through 
legislation, while the President establishes higher education initiatives and goals. 
Meanwhile, the postsecondary institutions determine individual amounts of aid provided 
                                                          
1 The Project on Student Debt strives to educate the public on benefits and drawbacks of taking on student 
loans. It is staffed by employees from the Institute for College Access & Success, a nonprofit research and 
policy organization. 
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to students that they received from the Education Department (ED) or a financial 
institution  (Taggart,  2010;;  “Student  Loans,”  2014).  Because each of these three groups 
affects federal student loans, student loan borrowers also seek all  players’ perspectives on 
higher education financing. The relationship between players is frustrating if borrowers’ 
investment in higher education backfires. 
 Higher  education  has  become  an  “economic  imperative”  (Obama,  2011,  para.  40)  
for success in the U.S. President Obama has recognized the importance of higher 
education; and therefore, established higher education as a national priority (Obama, 
2011). Alongside the President, studies from the ED, Sallie Mae, and the Institute for 
College and Success, promote the necessity of higher education as well, linking higher 
education with higher future earnings (Baum, S., Ma, J., & Payea, K., 2013). As policy 
makers and advocates share their perspectives on higher education with potential college 
students, more and more students buy into the justification to pursue postsecondary 
education.  In  Sallie  Mae’s  National  Study,  it affirms that over 70% of students attend 
college because it is required for a desired occupation or necessary to earn a higher salary 
(How America Pays for College 2012, 2012).  
 While many preach the wonders of education, they fail to address how students 
and families can pay for the expensive investment. Student loans have become the most 
popular way for students to pay for a college education (How America Pays for College 
2012, 2012; Baum, S., & Payea, K., 2013).  However, the popularity is accompanied by a 
$1 trillion student loan debt market (Chopra, 2012). Popular press, like Forbes or CFPB2 
                                                          
2 CFPB, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau compiles reports, shares guidance, and publishes 
opinion blogs on different financial products, such as student loans.  
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blogs,  has  labeled  the  increase  in  student  loan  borrowers  with  scary  words  like  “bubble”  
(Donlan,  2014,  para.19)  or  “too  big  to  fail”  (Chopra,  2012,  para.  2). 
 Dolan (2014), a writer for Forbes, applied the economic bubble analogy—the 
overinvestment in an asset that results in a devaluation of the asset—to the student loan 
debt market. Dolan determines that as college tuition rises, the rate of return on a college 
degree decreases; discrediting the soundness of student loan industry because more 
students default. Students who do not find employment needed to repay student loans are 
compared to debtors under sub-prime mortgages whose homes are worth less than what is 
owed to the bank. The difference between student loans and sub-prime mortgages is that 
students can never get away from their bad debt. 
Additionally, as students borrowed $117 billion in federal student loans in 2011, 
Chopra, a blogger from the CFPB, deems  it  possibly  “too  big  to  fail”  (Chopra,  2012,  
para. 2). The theory references financial institutions that are so large and interconnected 
that their failure would be detrimental to the entire economy.  Thus, the government 
should bail them out if the institutions were to collapse. Analogously, the student loan 
debt  slows  down  borrowers’  ability  to  start  a  business,  buy  a  home,  or  otherwise  reinvest  
in the economy. If the student debt market is too big to be self-sustainable, a bailout 
would manifest itself in debt forgiveness programs at the expense of tax payers.  
The  bubble  and  “too  big  to  fail” postulates warn how detrimental student loans 
can be on society. Because of the importance of higher education, the size of the student 
loan debt market, and the recent increase in student loan default, I first consider the 
federal student aid components and loan allocation process. After understanding the 
process, I determine the nature of study for this thesis. 
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Federal Student Aid Components and Allocation Process 
 The  Higher  Education  Act  of  1965  (HEA’65)  began  federal  student  aid.  Under  the  
HEA  ’65  and  future  reauthorizations,  Congress  and  ED  defined  student  aid  types  and  the  
student loan process. This section first outlines the changes in the HEA and then 
discusses the benefits and drawbacks of different federal aid types and the loan allocation 
process. 
 
The History of Higher Education Student Assistance 
The  Higher  Education  Act  of  1965  (HEA  ’65)  continued  a  pre-existing link 
between policy and higher education financing. Public policy and higher education 
financing first became intertwined when President Lincoln signed the Morrill Act3 into 
law  in  1862  (Loss,  2012).  Since  establishing  the  Morrill  Act,  the  government’s  
involvement in higher education funding continued to increase through legislation like 
the GI Bill4 in 1944 and the National Defense Education Act of 19585 (Hannah, 1996). 
Then,  HEA  ’65  “brought  together  a  variety  of  [these]  existing  student  aid  programs  
designed to meet earlier national education needs”  (Hannah,  1996,  p.  503).   
Key amendments structured present higher education policy. Between 1965 and 
1992,  multiple  amendments  were  made  to  HEA  ’65  which  included  the  introduction  of  
Sallie Mae and Pell grants. Throughout the next 30 years, amendments fluctuated 
between tightening and loosening borrowing regulations, such as income caps, interest 
                                                          
3Morrill Act: Signed into law by President Lincoln, the Morrill Act of 1862 provided each state 30,000 
acres of public land to encourage the establishment of higher education institutions to school people in 
agriculture, home economics, mechanical arts, and other professions. 
4GI  Bill:  Signed  into  law  by  President  Roosevelt,  the  Servicemen’s  readjustment  Act  of  1944  (known  as  the  
GI Bill of Rights) gave veterans financial support to attend higher education institutions. 
5 National Defense Education Act: NEA encouraged scientific schooling in response to the United States-
Russia space race. 
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rates, and loan discernment (Hannah, 1996). In 1992, Congress reauthorized HEA which 
Susan  Hannah  suggests  shifted  Title  IV’s  purpose  from  providing  need-based educational 
financing assistance to broadening the student loan consumer base (Hannah, 1996). From 
1992 to 2008, the number of Pell grant recipients remained small, denying the neediest 
group of potential college students a federal financial cushion. On the other hand, student 
loan legislation allocated more money to a wider range of potential college students. In 
2008, President Obama and Congress increased the number of grant recipients and 
attempted to include more financially needy students in the HEOA to refocus the purpose 
of financial aid (“Student  Loans,”  2014). 
While  HEA  ’65  includes  six  sections  or  “Titles,”  this  thesis  focuses  on  the  
amendments  to  “Title  IV,  Student  Assistance,”  from  its  inception  to  date.  Title  IV  
outlined federal grants and scholarship opportunities, federally subsidized Stafford 
Loans, and work-study programs (Higher Education Act of 1965 [HEA  ’65]).  The 
following section details each type of financial aid. 
 
Definitions under Student Assistance 
Students pursuing postsecondary education can attain many types of financial 
assistance in the form of a gift, loan, or work-study. Federal and state governments as 
well as private institutions provide student assistance. Typically, federal loans have fixed 
interest rates while private loans have variable interest rates (The Student Guide, 2010). 
Below are the most relevant types of student assistance along with benefits and 
drawbacks of each. 
Undergraduate student loans: Loan allocation and repayment struggles 
6 
 
x Federal Pell Grant (Pell grant): A Pell grant does not have to be repaid and is 
awarded to undergraduate students who demonstrate financial need, which is 
usually  determined  by  the  student’s  family  income.  While  Pell  grants  are  ideal  
for financially needy students, from a government perspective, it is the riskiest 
aid type because of the initial upfront cost with no explicit monetary payback. 
Hence, the federal government is investing in a student whose future impact on 
the economy is unknown (Barrow, L., Brock, T., & Rouse, E. 2013). 
x Work-study Program (work-study): Work-study programs allow a student to 
earn  money  to  pay  for  his/her  education.  The  government  considers  the  student’s  
financial need in awarding students participation in work-study programs by 
providing funds to institutions to subsidize student wages. Work-study 
encourages students to earn money for provided services. Although the federal 
government incurs an upfront cost, student employees are contributing to the 
economy (Barrow, L., Brock, T., & Rouse, E. 2013). Work-study accounts for 
less than 1% of federal aid, a historically standard amount, meaning it impacts a 
small percentage of aid recipients (Baum, S., & Payea, K., 2013). 
x Federal Perkins Loans (Perkins loans): A Perkins loan is lent by individual 
colleges to undergraduate or graduate students. Federal Perkins Loans are the 
optimal loan. The federal government provides colleges with limited funds to 
provide a few of the neediest students subsidized loans at a lower interest rate. 
The loan also has an abbreviated repayment plan compared to other federal 
student loans and offers better cancellation previsions6. Since the government 
                                                          
6 A portion of Perkins Loans can be forgiven if borrowers become full-time teachers in low-income 
elementary or secondary schools under The National Defense Education Act (FinAid, 2014). 
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makes less money on the loan, its benefits are not spread among much of the 
borrower population, consistently accounting for less than 4% of borrower 
student  aid  (“Student  Loans,”  2014;;  Baum,  S.,  &  Payea, K., 2011). 
x William D. Ford Direct Stafford Loans (Direct Loans or Stafford loans): Direct 
loans are lent directly from the ED to the student, rather than from a financial 
instruction originating the loan. The Direct Loan can be either subsidized or 
unsubsidized. For a subsidized loan, the ED pays interest on the loan until the 
student graduates from college provided the student demonstrates financial need. 
For an unsubsidized loan, the student pays the accrued interest on the loan once 
he/she has graduated from college, and the student does not need to demonstrate 
financial need. Colleges determine the amount of aid an individual receives. 
Direct Loans simplify the loan allocation process by making the postsecondary 
institution a one-stop-shop where the student receives loans and asks questions. 
However, the student is unable to shop the loan offer because the loan is only 
provided  by  the  ED  (“Student  Loan  Basics,”  2014).   
x Direct PLUS Loans (PLUS Loans): PLUS Loans are unsubsidized direct loans 
provided from the ED to graduate/professional students and parents of dependent 
undergraduate students. While the ED does not require financial need, the 
borrower must display a good credit history. PLUS loans are beneficial because 
they allow parents to invest in their  child’s  future  as  well.  Since  PLUS  loans  
cannot be transferred to the student, it protects student borrowers from having 
larger debt loads due to their parents’ decision, although many students are held 
jointly responsible by their parents (How America Pays for College 2012, 2012). 
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It is also easier for the federal government to vet parent borrowers because they 
have an existing credit history to be evaluated. A drawback to the additional 
borrowing option is that parents also may not realize Stafford loans have a lower 
interest rate, 3.86% versus 6.14%. Also, there are alternative methods for a parent 
to borrow for their child that is tax deductible, such as home equity loans 
(“Student  Loans,”  2014). 
x Direct Consolidation Loans (Consolidation Loans): Consolidation Loans allow 
students to combine multiple federal student loans into one loan. However, PLUS 
loans cannot be transferred to the student. Loan consolidation simplifies the loan 
process which helps financial management skills and provides students an 
opportunity to pay a lower interest rate on their loans. However, if borrowers are 
not savvy in financial literacy, they may consolidate when it is not beneficial. For 
example, if the borrower has several loans with a varying range of interest rates, 
it would be advantageous to accelerate the payment of the high interest loan 
rather  than  consolidate  and  pay  more  in  the  end  (“Student  Loans,”  2014). 
x Private Loans: Private Loans are issued from non-government institutions. 
Private loans are unsubsidized and usually require the student to have a good line 
of credit. Private loans cannot be consolidated with federal loans. Private loans 
give students an alternative method to finance higher education when federal 
student loans are not sufficient. On the other hand, private loans have higher 
interest rates, less oversight, and less transparent payback plan. Also the student 
has to work with banks or other lending institutions rather than their college 
(How America Pays for College 2012, 2012).  
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x Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFEL Loans): FFEL Loans 
encompass Stafford Loans, PLUS Loans, and Consolidated Loans from private 
lenders rather than government institutions. FFELP Loans enlist multiple parties. 
Similar to direct loans, the school determines financial eligibility. Then there is a 
lender, guarantor, servicer, collection agencies, and a secondary market. The 
lender is a private institution, like Sallie Mae. The guarantor, a non-profit 
organization, works with the ED, lenders, services and schools to ensure students 
repay their loans. The servicer collects the loan payments and assists and answers 
questions  concerning  students’  loans.  The  collection  agency  specializes  in  
delinquent/defaulted loans and is hired by lenders to recover loans. Lastly, the 
secondary market buys loans from lenders to provide capital for lenders to 
originate the loans. The benefit to FFEL Loans is the power of choice. The 
frustration many students felt was the confusion in navigating multiple parties 
(“Student  Loan  Basics,”  2014). FFEL Loans have not been offered since 2010 
(“Student  Loans,”  2014).   
Each federal aid type could be advantageous for a certain borrower or parent. The key to 
maximizing the federal aid a student receives is his/her ability to navigate the choices. 
Overall, students receive Stafford loans when they apply for federal financial aid—
making up over 40% of federal aid in 2010—meaning the allocation process for Stafford 
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Evaluation of Student Aid Types 
After considering the loan options, there are two problems with the current 
student loan structure. First, there are too many types of student aid (Dynarski & Scott-
Clayton, 2013). Currently, the ED allows students to borrow from a variety of debt 
instruments. Choice is preferred in a transparent market where the consumer fully 
understands his/her options. For student financial aid, each instrument has numerous 
intricacies which the ED unfairly expects high school graduates to understand. I applaud 
the ED, along with President Obama and higher education advocacy groups who are 
working to provide clarity in the market through better financial aid counseling. 
However, maintaining a laundry list of financial aid types is still worrisome. Second, the 
federal financial aid that is the best value for a student is misaligned with the aid that is 
the best value for the lender, either the ED or private institutions. Namely, work-study 
and Perkins Loan programs account for 5% of all financial aid but provide students with 
the highest return on educational investment. However, other student loan types have 
higher interest rates, costing students much more. Economically, in order for the ED to 
sustain a federal aid program, they have to charge students more; socially, the federal 
government should also work to benefit borrowers.  
 
Student Loan Process 
 A borrower, student or parent, must follow certain steps to obtain student 
assistance, federal or private. To obtain federal assistance, the borrower outlines the cost 
of attendance and financial need. Private student loans are obtained similarly to any 
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domestic loan, and thus the process parallels other loan processes (The Student Guide, 
2010).  Then after the borrower graduates, he/she follows a repayment plan. 
 To apply for federal student assistance, a student completes a series of steps. First, 
a student must submit a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) for the 
government to determine the financial neediness of the student. FAFSA determines 
eligibility for grants, work-study, state aid, and loan type. After submitting the FAFSA, 
the ED sends the student a Student Aid Report (SAR) with a summary of the FAFSA and 
Expected Family Contribution (EFC), which determines the eligibility for different 
student assistance programs. The SAR is sent to the postsecondary institutions that the 
student has indicated on the FAFSA. The postsecondary institution determines eligibility 
and  the  amount  based  on  a  student’s  financial need, the difference between EFC and 
COA (The Student Guide, 2010). Next, a student receives an award letter outlining the 
student’s  financial  aid  package  which  explains  payment  schedules  and  expense  
breakdowns. Once accepting the loan, the student commits to the payment schedule and 
the loan provider commits to the allotted amount7. Lastly, the student receives the money 
in  two  disbursements  (“Smart  about  College”,  2011).   
To qualify for any federal student aid, students have to meet specific basic 
requirements. Basic eligibility requirements to receive federal financial aid are: 
x Demonstration of financial need; 
x Proof of U.S. citizenship or non-citizenship eligibility; 
x A valid Social Security number; 
x Registration with the Selective Service (males only); 
                                                          
7 Since HEOA, the ED is the only federal loan provider. 
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x Showing of enrollment or acceptance for enrollment by an eligible degree 
program; 
x Part-time enrollment to receive Direct Loans; 
x Maintenance of satisfactory academic progress; 
x A promise to spend aid for only educational purposes; and 
x Demonstration of a high school diploma or General Educational Development 
(GED) certificate (Smart about college, 2011). 
These basic requirements have changed only slightly since 1965, except for the FAFSA 
report,  which  the  government  added  through  HEA  ’92.  Once  the  government  decides  that  
the student meets the criteria, the government assesses financial need to determine federal 
student aid allocation (The Student Guide, 2010). 
After graduation, a borrower chooses one of the four types of repayment plans: 
(1) standard repayment; (2) extended repayment; (3) graduated repayment; and (4) a 
percentage of income repayment. Also, a borrower is entitled to change repayment plans 
during the repayment period. A borrower under the standard repayment plan pays a fixed 
monthly amount of the loan for up to 10 years. The extended monthly repayment plan 
copies the standard repayment plan except it allows borrowers 12 to 30 years to reduce 
the size of repayment but increases the lifetime total amount paid. The graduated 
repayment plan begins with smaller monthly payments and increases every two years 
lasting 12 to 30 years. 
Lastly, there are three plans that consider a borrower’s income. The income-
contingent  repayment  plan  pays  a  percentage  of  the  borrower’s  income  and  monthly  
payments  are  adjusted  as  the  borrower’s  gross  income  grows for Direct Loan borrowers. 
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This is similar to the Income Sensitive Repayment plan offered to FFELP borrowers. 
Income-Based Repayment caps monthly payments at a lower percentage of discretionary 
income  instead  of  gross  income  (“Student  loans”,  2014). 
 
Evaluation of Student Loan Process 
While the standardized student loan process connects a number of students with 
financial aid, it is overly complex and inefficient. First, the FAFSA is a daunting 
application which rivals a 1040 tax form in length. It takes approximately three hours to 
complete and is usually filled out incorrectly by students not familiar with the financial 
aid process. The document should be streamlined to incorporate only unavailable 
information about a potential borrower (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2013). The 
FAFSA’s  intimidation  causes  many  students  to  miss  aid  opportunities.  In  2007,  2.3  
million students were not considered for Pell grant aid because they did not complete the 
FAFSA (Abernathy et al. (2013).  
Second, the financial equation colleges use to determine aid eligibility and 
amount ineffectively evaluates students. While Direct PLUS borrowers have sufficient 
credit history to be screened, the ED has less specific information for student borrowers 
(Abernathy et al., 2013). Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2013) argue that the ED lacks 
structure in ranking student eligibility, resulting in the student aid agency incorrectly 
identifying the types of aid, gifts, unsubsidized loans, subsidized loans, or a combination 
of any they award students. The equation also does not measure individual 
characteristics,  like  students’  financial  knowledge  or  motivation.   
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The Nature of Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of the federal Stafford 
student loan allocation for undergraduate students. The role of Stafford loans is 
interesting since they are taken on by the majority of loan recipients. As Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton (2013) highlight the inefficiency of the student loan process and borrowers, 
like Christen Kauffman relays distress in repaying her student loan amount, the study 
tests whether the two are linked. Loan allocation is measured by means of federal loan 
limits, the maximum amount a student is about to borrow, and a student default rate 
reflect  student’s  problems repaying loans.  
Since the ED locks individual student borrower information for privacy reasons, I 
use public aggregated data to determine if loan allocation or any other institutional 
factors impact student loan default. From the study, I attempt answer two questions: 
1. To what extent does student loan allocation impact student default rates? 
2. Is loan allocation or any other institutional factor significant contributors 
to student loan default? 
If loan allocation or any other institutional factor is the driving factor of student loan 
default, then ED can depress default through restructuring institutional characteristics, 
like the amount or types of aid offered. However, if institutional factors do not 
significantly drive student loan default, the ED should create an alternate method of 
screening potential borrowers based on their individual characteristics. 
 My study uses empirical analysis to determine the impact of federal loan limits 
and other institutional factors on student loan default rates. To perform the study, I first 
consider available literature on federal loan limits, undergraduate student default rates, 
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and other potential institutional factors. Through the literature review, I build the 
foundation for my study by analyzing existing research and evaluating controversial 
findings. Next, I outline the methodology of my study to explain the process for selecting 
and measuring the data used in the empirical study. Then, I report the results of my 
analysis and determine statistically significant and other relevant relationships. From my 
findings, I answer my two questions. Lastly, I describe three popular higher education 
financing alternatives and conclude how loan allocation can be reformed. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section discusses the literature surrounding student loan allocation, student 
loan default rates, and other higher educational institutional factors. To begin, I describe 
the relevance of student loan program maximums in loan allocation. Second, I provide a 
condensed history of federal student loan program maximums and discuss the 
controversy around them. Next, I describe the impact of student loan default. Lastly, I 
describe other potential institutional drivers of student loan default. 
 
Relevance of Student Loan Program Maximums 
 Under  the  HEA  ’65,  Congress  established  program  loan  limits  to  regulate  federal  
loan allocation. The loan limits established the maximum amount colleges could provide 
to aid-eligible students. The loan limits are tailored to several characteristics, including 
the type of student loan, the nature of the loan (i.e., whether it is subsidized or 
unsubsidized),  the  borrower’s  profile,  and  the  dependency or independency of the student 
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(HEA  ’65;;  “Student  loans,”  2014)8. Congress created annual and aggregate loan limits 
(program maximums), which are defined below:  
x Annual loan limit: The annual loan limit specifies the maximum loan amount a 
student can borrow depending on year or credit status when attending a higher 
education institution. The annual loan limit changes as a student transition from 
freshman to senior year. 
x Aggregate loan limit (program maximum): The program maximum is the largest 
loan amount a student can borrow throughout his/her undergraduate career 
(“Student  loans,”  2014).   
Also, students can borrow up to the program maximum but may be constrained by 
individual borrowing maximums set by postsecondary institutions according to student 
financial need and budget. Hence, the individual maximum ranges from zero to the 
program maximum (Wei & Skomsvold, 2011). This thesis analysis uses program loan 
limits for two reasons: (1) they encapsulate all underlying annual loan limit changes and 
(2) program loan limits are positively correlated with individual limits (Historical Loan 
Limits, 2014).  
 Program maximums show the changes in annual loan limits since Congress 
increases the limits proportionally. Hence, program loan limits represent increases in the 
underlying years as well. When borrowers begin repayment, they pay interest on the total 
amount they borrowed, not on their different annual loans individually. 
More importantly, program limits are positively correlated with individual limits. 
NCES reports published in 1995 and 2013, 65% of public and private postsecondary 
institutions ranked increasing program limits as a reason to increase individual maximum 
                                                          
8 After  HEA  ’92,  PLUS  loans  have  no  borrowing  limit  (“Student  loans,” 2014) 
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allocation when considering student financial need (Lewis & Westat, 1995; Snyder & 
Dillow, 2013). Additionally, in Borrowing at the Maximum (2011), Christina Chang Wei 
and Paul Skomsvold note trends in student borrowing at the loan limits in 2011. Wei and 
Skomsvold highlighted the trend of student borrowing in relation to loan limits from the 
1980s to 2008. The authors found that between 40-50% of borrowers have taken out the 
program’s  maximum  amount. Also, many reports, such as those authored by the 
American Institutes for Research, use program maximums as the proxy of loan limit 
effects and amounts students borrow. 
As the majority of students borrow at or near loan limits, program maximums 
allow Congress and the executive branch to manage the expansion and consolidation of 
the student loan debt market. Thus, program loan limit legislation not only considers 
student need but also depends on political initiatives.  
 
History of Federal Student Loan Program Maximums 
 Congressional legislative action resulted in incremental increases to program and 
annual loan limits presented in Figure 1. Congress enacted the first loan limit increase 
within the 1986 HEA reauthorization process. Under President Regan, 1986 legislation 
established a need test to determine student eligibility which limited borrowing to the 
minimum amount students needed. However, the legislation increased program loan 
limits by 38% in order to ensure future loan program growth for both subsidized and 
unsubsidized loans limits. Regan began the transition from grant to loan based aid. By the 
reauthorization of 1992, the ideal federal student aid program was disintegrating. Pell 
grants were costly to the federal government and did not keep up with rising costs of 
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college, forcing students to become more reliant on federal loans. With a desire to cut 
federal spending, policy makers—including President George H. W. Bush—abandoned 
initiatives to focus federal aid on Pell grants which shifted primary federal aid 
beneficiaries from the lower-income students to middle- and upper-income students by 
raising loan limits an additional 31% for dependent students and 100% for independent 
students (Cervantes et al., 2005). The official move from a grant to a loan centric 
financial aid policy resulted in exponential growth in the number of students borrowing 
loans and the amount students were allowed to borrow (Hannah, 1996). During the HEA 
Reauthorization of 1998, President Clinton exhibited fiscal discipline by not raising 
federal loan limits but did raise the Pell maximum (Cervantes et al., 2005). Then, in 2007, 
President Obama declared the purpose of federal aid was to help all students achieve 
higher education. In turn, he drastically raised student loan limits—by 35% and 25% for 
dependent and independent students, respectively—and raised the Pell grant to 
compensate for the cost of attending higher education (Scott, 2011).  
 
Note: Adapted from “Student  Loans,”  (2014).  FinAid. Retrieved from http://www.finaid.org/loans/ 
 
Figure 1 Percent Increases of Program Maximum by Dependency Type from HEA 
Reauthorizations 
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 While Congress and the executive branch strived to increase financing for 
students’  higher  education  in  a  cost-effective manner, the reauthorizations that grew 
program maximums propelled student loan debt levels. As shown in Figure 2, student 
loan debt levels are strongly correlated with program loan limits implying that students 
take advantage of program limit increases. Policy makers should be conscious of this 










Figure 2 The relationship between program limits and student 
loan debt level 
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Controversy of Program Loan Limits 
Although three out of four reauthorizations increased student loan limits, there 
have been numerous debates surrounding the effectiveness of the legislation. Generally, 
Republican administrations try to direct federal aid away from costly grant aid to revenue 
generating student loan programs. Democratic admirations have attempted to expand aid 
to include more lower-income students either through Pell grants or federal student loans.  
In the following paragraphs, I describe both advantages and drawbacks of loan 
limits as outlined by key influencers—policy makers, political organizations, and 
academia. 
 
Benefits of Loan Limits 
Policy makers, much like Congress; certain political organizations, like the New 
America Foundation (NAF); and academia applaud the role of loan limits. The 
Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO),  Congress’  auditing  arm,  endorses student 
loan limits as a uniform method to regulate student borrowing. The GAO cites increased 
enrollment and borrowing numbers for full-time college programs to praise Congress for 
successfully accomplishing two initiatives through student loan limits increases: (1) 
minimizing excessive student loan debt per borrower and (2) enabling students to finance 
their education through increased access to capital (Scott, 2011). 
Political organizations, such as the New America Foundation9 (NAF), also voice 
supporting viewpoints on loan limits. The non-partisan organization explains that loan 
limits control student borrowing and inhibit students from overborrowing. However, 
NAF concedes that loan limits are not the only avenue for the federal government or 
                                                          
9 The NAF is a non-partisan think tank with one of the most vocal stances on student aid. 
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colleges  to  monitor  students’  accumulation  of  student  loans.  With  limits,  NAF  proclaims  
that colleges need to do a better job providing a multi-year price schedule, transparent 
financial need, and cost-of-attendance calculation to their students. 
 In the Journal of Economic Perspective, Avery and Turner (2012) claim that 
capital availability, especially through student loans, is imperative to encourage students 
to invest in higher education. In addition, the authors encourage loan limit increases 
because of the increased cost of attending higher education. Many other researchers 
substantiate  Avery  and  Turner’s  claim  by  pointing  to  the  positive  correlation  between  the  
increase in access to capital—through loan limit upticks—and the increase in student 
enrollment (Akyol & Athreya, 2005; Garriga & Keightley, 2007). 
 
Disadvantages of Loan Limits  
 While some policy makers, political organizations, and some academics 
champion loan limits, others claim loan limits are an ineffective tool in managing the 
amount students borrow. To start, President Obama has taken an active role in higher 
education and how students pay for it. The President has recently denounced the 
successfulness of the current loan-allocation process. While President Obama views 
student loans as an avenue to increase college enrollment numbers, he highlights how 
current program limits do not match the quality of the postsecondary institution. Hence, 
he states that student borrowing is reinforcing the bloated debt total and high student loan 
default rates. Thus, while the legislative and executive arms of government are aligned in 
their desire to bolster student aid, the two branches are at odds over the efficacy of the 
current program limits (Obama, 2011). 
Undergraduate student loans: Loan allocation and repayment struggles 
22 
 
Within academia, opponents of loan limits disfavor randomly crafted loan limits 
and unproductive individual student loan allocation. In research under the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Garriga and Keighley (2007) support the idea of capped 
borrowing but argue that loan limits come up short because they are arbitrarily created 
and not indexed according to the cost of attendance increases or changes in inflation. 
Through their study of education policy, Garriga and Keighley assert that students are not 
receiving the amount of aid they actually need. They further assert that loan limit 
increases should better track financial-need changes of students. 
Additionally, some in academia worry that loan limits unsuccessfully tailor 
individual loan amounts to students. In the Economics of Education Review, Hansen and 
Rhodes (1988) voice concern over the government haphazardly allocating extra capital 
without understanding undergraduate borrowers. Through a study of borrowers with 
varying amounts of debt after the HEA reauthorization of 1986, Hansen and Rhodes 
determined that loan limit increases could amplify the amount borrowed by risk-prone 
undergraduates who are uncertain of future earnings. Because student loans are 
uncollateralized, their research revealed the challenges faced by lenders, such as the 
federal government and commercial banks, in appropriately vetting borrowers to 
determine risk appetite and reliability to pay back the loan (Hansen & Rhodes, 1988, 
Garriga & Keightley, 2007). Although Avery and Turner (2012) acknowledge loan limits 
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Loan Limit Literature Implications 
Since 1992, loan limit legislation has wrestled with promoting college enrollment 
and mitigating excess borrowing. At inception, the HEA  ‘65  established  federal  student  
loans to help low-income students to pay for college and created program loan limits to 
keep that fraction of students from overborrowing. As the1992 reauthorization expanded 
program limits and borrower eligibility requirements, it became harder for Congress, the 
ED, and colleges to predict perfect individual borrowing amounts because the student 
loan market and college landscape changed. In the student loan market, a greater number 
of diverse students are involved in the process, and cost of attending college surpassed 
predictions. Hence, as shown by Hanson and Rhodes (1988); Garriga and Keightley 
(2007); Avery and Turner (2012), it is difficult to subjectively classify current loan 
allocation method as good—because it is statistically shown to increase college 
enrollment—or bad—because it allows Congress to arbitrarily distribute debt to students.  
 
Impact of Student Loan Default 
A student enters default if he/she fails to repay a federal student loan according to 
the terms agreed to in the promissory note. As a general rule, a student has defaulted on 
student loan after 270 days of a missed payment10. If a borrower defaults on a student 
loan that is owned by ED, the borrower faces the following consequences: loan balance 
due in full; loan collection fees; 15% deduction out of his/her paycheck; Social Security, 
disability income, and state and federal tax refunds taken; ineligibility for federal aid; and 
ruined credit score. The borrower recovers from default by repaying the loan in full, 
                                                          
10 Between  the  first  skipped  payment  and  270  days,  the  borrower  is  in  a  state  of  delinquently  (“Student  
loans,”  2014). 
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entering  a  loan  rehabilitation  program,  or  consolidating  out  of  default  (“Managing  
Default,”  2014). 
Annual default rates are measured by the official two-year cohort default rate 
(cohort default rate). The cohort default rate is the aggregated number of borrowers in 
default who entered repayment on a certain Direct Loan or FFEL Loan two years prior. 
For example, the fiscal year (FY) 2011 cohort rates were released in 2013. To expand 
payback period window, the HEOA of 2007 requires the ED to also calculate and report 
three-year  cohort  default  rates  beginning  in  2009  (“Two-year Official Cohort Default 
Rates for School," 2013). By accounting for an additional payback year, the policy 
change better reflects the reality of student prepayment problems. 
Congress crafts student loan default policy by making incremental changes to the 
HEA. Figure 3 presents the historic events that impacted default loan policy. First, during 
the 1986 reauthorization of HEA, student loan default rates became a recurring topic. 
Because student loan default rates were obscenely high, over 20%, Congress planned to 
enact federal legislation that penalized colleges with high default rates (Gross et al., 
2009). Then, beginning in 1990, the government declared colleges with student default 
rates greater than 25% over three years or over 40% in one year ineligible to participate 
in federal student loan programs. The legislation ensured college accountability for 
student default behavior (Volkwein & Szelest, 1995). However, Congress’  concerns  grew  
after the expansion of student loans in the 1992 reauthorization. In 1998, Congress 
extended the amount of days a student could miss a payment from 180 days to 270 days. 
The shift more accurately represented the fraction of the student cohort who struggled to 
repay student loans (Gross et al., 2009). Years later, Representatives Timothy Bishop (D-
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NY) and Raul Grijalya (D-AZ) expressed skepticism about default calculation11. In 
response,  Congress’  2008  reauthorization  act  further  extended  the  default calculation 
window to three years.  
While  changes  in  the  HEA  continue  to  increase  college’s  accountability  for  
default  rates,  Congress’  default  rate  caps  place  little  pressure  on  most  colleges.  For 
example, less than 2% of colleges surpassed the student loan threshold while 10% of 
student  borrowers  went  into  default  (“Default  Management,”  2013).  Hence,  the majority 
of colleges are unaffected by Congressional sanctions but are more likely to help students 
overborrow. 
 
The Progression on Default Rate Policy 
 
 
                                                          
11 Timothy Bishop (D-NY) and Raul Grijalya (D-AZ) introduced the amendment encompassed in the 
HEOA that extends the default window calculation to three years. 
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Figure 3 The Progression on Default Rate Policy 
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Student loan default has a high social cost to policymakers and students. On the 
students’ side, student loan default can trap students because they cannot declare 
bankruptcy and abandon their debt. Hira et al. (2000) found that once students incur 
student loans, they are reluctant to invest in the economy through homes, cars, or credit 
cards purchases because they fear entering default. Forbes writer Halah Touryalai affirms 
her own belief that student loan debt inhibits economic growth. Touryalai relays quote 
from CFPB Director Richard Cordray discussing the inability for borrowers to take on 
other loans because of student loan debt and lack of credit (2014). 
On the policy makers’ side, student loan default affirms misallocation of federal 
loans. Policy makers and academia largely measure productivity of federal student loan 
programs by default rates of student loans (Gross et al., 2009). Over time, two-year 
cohort default rates and default amounts are lower than they were during the late 1980s, 
but have recently increased since the Great Recession, as seen in Figure 4. Both policy 
makers and academia have voiced concern over the sharp increase in student loan default 
amounts that is up 111% since 2007 (Two-Year Official Cohort Default Rate, 2013). 
Throughout the last five years, policy influencers have attempted to better understand 
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Figure 4 Two-yr. Cohort Default Rate and Amount 
 
Note: Adapted  from  “Baum, S., & Payea, K. (2013). Trends in student aid: 2013.” 
 
Potential Causes of Default Rates 
In addition to loan limits, education research has isolated potential drivers that 
impact student loan default. One driver is the individual borrower characteristics. The 
other five drivers are related to institutional factors: (1) higher education cost of 
attendance; (2) number of loan recipients; (3) number of Pell Grant aid recipients; (4) the 
economy’s  view  of  debt;;  and  (5)  the  state  of  the  economy  (Goss  et  al.,  2009;;  Dynarski  &  
Scott-Clayton, 2013). 
Individual Characteristics 
Academia has released extensive research on the role of student borrower 
characteristics and background. The characteristics include: age, race, gender, and family 
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each characteristic on the chance of default. Almost all research positively correlates a 
student’s  age  with  chance  of  default,  often  citing  causes  such  as  greater  financial  
obligations and less external monetary support (Gross et al., 2009; Choy & Li, 2006). 
Research  on  the  borrower’s  race  concludes  that  borrower’s ethnicity is the greatest 
predictor of default. Students of color, especially African Americans, have a greater 
probability of default than their Caucasian peers. Contrastingly, gender appears to have 
little  correlation  with  probability  of  default.  Lastly,  studies  on  the  borrower’s  family’s  
socioeconomic standing suggest that students of higher income families are less likely to 
default because of a familial financial safety net. Thus, empirical research largely agrees 
on  how  changes  in  borrower  characteristics  affect  borrowers’  likeliness  of  default. 
Financial  planning  can  also  play  a  role  in  the  borrower’s  likeliness  of  default  
(Gross et al., 2009). Gross  et  al.  (2009)  cited  Dynarski’s  (1994)  previous  studies  to  
validate the role of money management in the probability of student loan default. Sallie 
Mae  (2012),  Volkwin  and  Szelst  (1995),  and  other  studies  agree  with  Dynarski’s  (1994)  
perspective on the importance of money management skills, especially as student 
borrower debt expands into other consumer debt types (e.g. credit cards, auto loans, etc.). 
Other types of consumer loan debt, particularly credit card debt, gain popularity as 
students attend college, indicated by the 60% of college seniors who owned a credit card 
in 2012, up 4% since 2011 (Sallie Mae, 2012).  
Cost of Attendance 
The cost of attending college has increased overtime, forcing students to invest 
more in their education. As students seek optimal educational experiences, the cost of 
college has simultaneously decreased in importance. Different influencers have worked 
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to help students surmount the cost threshold. Congress has increased loan limits in order 
to match college cost increases. The ED works to educate students on loan opportunities 
and  helps  them  complete  their  FAFSA  applications  (“Student  Loans,”  2014).  
Additionally, students have responded to upswings in college cost of attendance by 
taking on more debt. Gross, Cekic, Hossler, and Hillman (2009) as well as Avery and 
Turner  (2012)  agree  students’  responses to increased tuition fees have propelled them 
into default.   
 
Number of Loan Recipients 
 Researchers argue that the number of student aid recipients either increase or 
decrease default rates. In the Review of Higher Education, Hillman (2014) reports 
increased popularity of higher education, coupled with federal and state efforts to 
increase college completion programs, expands the number of aid-reliant students. 
Hillman notes that the growth in the borrower population results in more students unable 
to repay greater loan amounts. Hannah (1996) supported this notion years earlier when 
evaluating the inclusion of merit-based scholarships after the HEA Reauthorization Act 
in 1992. Hannah found dangers in expanding the number of loan recipients because more 
students unaware of their future earnings were included in the loan pool which increased 
default rates. Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2013) add that increasing the volume of 
students unnecessarily receiving aid has caused the student loan debt total to bloat to 
unreasonably large levels. 
Contrastingly, in the Policy Sciences Journal, Singell and Stater (2006) view 
growth in loan recipients as a way to lessen default rates. The authors note that recipients 
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who are not in the lower class and qualify for aid are more likely to repay their debt. 
Thus, more borrowers lessen the riskiness of the pool of potential defaulters.  
 
Number of Grant Recipients 
Since 1965, policy makers and academia have conducted substantial research 
around federal grant aid. Keane summarizes the findings that suggest low income 
students need grant support to get over the college cost threshold, and the decrease of 
grant  aid  recipients  increase  these  students’  chances of default (2002). Hillman (2014) 
argues that the decrease in grant funding has increased student reliability regarding 
student loans, thereby increasing the pool of potential defaulters. Interestingly, Hillman 
reports that students with higher amounts of grant aid have a greater chance of defaulting 
because the neediest have the least amount of external support—family, friends, or 
otherwise— to finance student loans.  
 
The Economy 
 The state of the economy also plays an influential role in determining a  student’s  
likelihood of default. During a recession, for example, the amount of money students 
have to repay loans are greatly constricted. The Economic Policy Institute reports that 
students who graduated during the Great Recession struggled more with repaying their 
student loans (Shierholz, H. Wething, H. & Sabadish, N., 2012). They argue that not only 
are  students’  financial  resources  constrained,  but  their  possible  support  systems  –family 
members or savings—were constrained as well. Moreover, Woo (2002) found that 
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unemployment  increases  a  student’s  odds  of  defaulting  since  job  loss  negatively  impacts  
financial resources used to pay student loan debt. 
 Additionally, student loan debt is only one type of household debt. Other 
household debt includes car loans, credit card debt, and mortgages. As the economy goes 
through peaks and troughs, household comfort for managing debt varies. During 
recessions, at times, households choose to pay off some debt over others. For example, 
during the economic downturns, some people choose to pay off their car loans rather than 
their mortgage payment (Flint, 1997).  Hence, the level of comfort the economy has with 
managing debt can indirectly impact student loan default rates. 
 
Significance of Default Literature 
Research has placed varying weights on the six variables to suggest which are 
more important in predicting student loan default. While much research sites the 
individual’s  characteristics  as  the  most  relevant  driver  of  student  default  (Gross  et.  al,  
2009; Flint, 1997), the other institutional drivers play a role in students’ ability to pay 
back loans. Similarly to loan limits, it is difficult for Congress, the President, or academia 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
In this section, I explain the steps in my data collection and analysis that lead to 
my final results, the isolated impact of student loan borrowing limits on two-year cohort 
default rate. First, I describe my data selection approach. Second, I summarize my 
research design and data collection. Next, I explain my data measurement process, multi-
variable regression analysis. Then, I provide rationale for the variables I use to determine 
the relationship between student loan limits and student default rates. Lastly, I reference 
potential limitations of my research design. 
 
Data Selection Approach 
In  my  data  selection  approach,  I  delineate  terminology,  specify  my  study’s  
timeframe,  and  distinguish  participants’  profiles.  To  start,  I  narrow  the  focus  of  higher 
education institutions as an establishment that offers post-secondary education to 
undergraduate or graduate student. Within higher education institutions, I only 
concentrate on public and private schools. My definition of a public school is a state 
funded higher education institution built on a four-year program. Similarly, my definition 
of a private school is a not-for-profit higher education institution built on a four-year 
program. Because of incomplete for-profit, higher education institutions data, I only 
focus on not-for-profit higher education institutions that educate 88% of post-secondary 
students (NCES, 2012). 
My data has a timeframe constraint to accommodate the student loan default rate 
relevance. Although the HEA depicted loan limit specifications and student default 
qualifications in 1965, higher education institutions did not monitor default rates until the 
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1987  cohort  (“Student  loans,”  2014).  Thus,  the  study’s  timeline  begins  in  1987  when  
Congress encouraged institutions to refocus on providing affordable education to 
students. The study ends in 2011, the most recent cohort default rate released. The data 
collection timeline was not constrained by loan limits because the ED oversaw allocated 
Stafford  loans  since  inception  (“Student  loans,”  2014).  Lastly,  for  the  purpose  of  this  
study, I tailor my analysis to the aid-eligible undergraduate population attending either 
public or private schools.  
 
Research Design and Data Collection 
My research design aims to correlate loan limits and other variables to default 
rates. To begin my study, I collect data samples which academics postulate impact the 
likelihood of students defaulting on their loans. Because I am studying and comparing the 
isolated impact of loan limits on public and private schools separately, I created a public 
school regression model and private school regression model. The two models allow me 
to separate and compare the characteristics of students who attend either institution. The 
models measure identical variables with numbers stemming from public or private 
instructions. I, then, compare the strength of the association between the dependent 
variable, cohort default rates, and the range of independent variables, namely student loan 
limits, to determine impactful drivers (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988).  
After considering the major drivers of student loan default rates, I compiled data 
through a range of public government sources. Any data related to higher education 
participants and institutions derive from offices under the ED or recent studies sponsored 
by ED. The offices include the Office of Postsecondary Education Policy, Planning, and 
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Innovation as well as FinAid. The studies include reports from NCES and the 
Information for Financial Aid Professionals (IFAP). The offices and studies have 
surveyed, aggregated, and updated facts/statistics about higher education since HEA 
indoctrination. Hence, they are the primary sources of other educational studies, such as 
the Project on Student Debt, validating data accuracy. Moreover, for economic data I 
utilize reports from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and 
the Federal Reserve Board. Lastly, I note correlations between historical cohort default 
rates and other variables from the highlighted data the model to empirically report the 
role of loan limits on default rates.  
 
Data Measurement Process: Multiple Regression Analysis 
I use multi-variable regression analysis because it is the optimal analysis tool to 
evaluate the relationships between variables both quantitatively and qualitatively. After 
selecting and classifying my independent and dependent variables, I run multiple 
regressions and analyze the significance of coefficients. I run correlation tables to ensure 
no independent variable measurements overlap and skew results (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & 
Muller, 1988). 
To analyze the data, I apply industry standards to determine the significance of a 
regression statistic. I use a .05 level of significance. Correlations between variables 
should be less than .7, shown in Appendix A (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988). 
  For the public school and private school regressions, I evaluate the models’ based 
on the regression statistics: variable coefficients and probability of result. From there, I 
declare statistical significance of the public school model and private school model. 
Undergraduate student loans: Loan allocation and repayment struggles 
35 
 
Rationale for Selected Variables 
 The public and private school models consider identical dependent and 
independent variables. The two-year cohort default rate is the dependent variable, 
meaning its outcome is measured against other drivers. The independent variables include 
loan limits and four other drivers of default rates highlighted by academia. The 
independent variables are grouped into either educational drivers or economic drivers. 
The educational drivers include amount of public/private loan recipients and amount of 
private/public Pell Grant aid recipients. The economic drivers include the Financial 
Obligations Ratio and unemployment rates. These specific drivers are chosen by 
considering two integral concepts: (1) variable representation within another variable and 
(2) level of variable significance. In this section, I describe the rational and computation 
of the dependent variable, two-year cohort default rates as well as the independent 
variables, loan limits, other educational drivers, and economic drivers.  
 
Two-Year Cohort Default Rates 
 ED’s  archived  default rate data sheets provided individual default rates for all 
U.S. higher education institutions. I compile the two-year cohort rates by separately 
averaging all U.S. public and private school two-year cohort default rates. While three-
year cohort default  rates  better  encapsulate  borrowers’  likelihood  of  default,  I  use  two-
year default rates over the three-year due to lack of historical three-year default rate data 
(“Default  Management,”  2013).  Thus,  two-year cohort default rates are the most 
consistent measurement of the extent students struggle with repaying student loans 
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(“Student  Loan  Basics,”  2014). Figure 5 shows the changes in public and private school 
default rates. 
Figure 5 Public and Private School Default Rates 
 
Note: Adapted  from  “Archive Two-Year Default Rates. Department of Education.” 
 
Student Loan Limits 
 FinAid provides annual and aggregate student loan limits by type (subsidized or 
unsubsidized) and student dependency status. Since independent and dependent students 
qualify for different loan amounts, I standardize loan limits by applying weights based on 
yearly dependency proportion breakdowns to the aggregate loan limit amounts. 
Additionally, Congress establishes loan limits separately from higher education 
institution type, meaning loan limits are the same for the public school and private school 
model.  
Variations in program loan limits also explain variation in individual loan limits 
and college cost of attendance. Hence, individual loan limit amounts are not included in 
the model because individual amount variation is encapsulated in loan limit changes. The 
relationship occurs for two reasons: (1) many students borrow at the program limits and 
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(2) colleges use program limits increases to construct individual loan limits. Thus, the 
program loan limit driver is more relevant to the study. Cost of attendance is not included 
in the model because Congress aims to construct program loan limits alongside increases 
in cost of attendance which causes the variables to have high collinearity which 
negatively impacts the model. Changes in loan limit are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Other Educational Drivers 
Academia  highlights  other  trends  in  higher  education  that  could  affect  a  student’s  
chance of repayment: the growth of student loan recipients and the decrease of grant aid 
(Gross et. al, 2009; Hillman, 2014). To test other educational trends, I collected the 
historical data from the NCES for amount of loan recipients as well as amount of Pell 
grant and state grant recipients (Snyder, Dillow, & Hoffman, 2009). I normalize both 
variables by using the ratio of number of public/private recipients to number 
public/private enrollment numbers each year. Furthermore, I solely use the number of 
Pell and state grant recipients because the amount per recipient remains constant year 
over year. Figure 6 and 7 shows the changes in public and private school loan and grant 
aid recipients. 
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Figure 6 Public and Private School Loan Recipients 
 
Note: Adapted  from  “Baum, S., & Payea, K. (2013). Trends in student aid: 2013.” 
 
Figure 7 Public and Private School State and Grant Aid Recipients 
 
Note: Adapted  from  “Baum, S., & Payea, K. (2013). Trends in student aid: 2013.” 
 
Economic Drivers 
 The  state  of  the  employment  economy  impacts  any  debt  borrower’s  ability  to  




Public and Private School State 
and Grant Aid Recipients
% Public Pell Grant and State Aid Recipients% Private Pell Grant and State Aid Recipients
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consider the financial obligations ratio  (FOR)  to  account  for  consumers’  comfort  with  
debt. FOR estimates the ratio of household debt payment to disposable income and other 
financial obligations, such as automobile lease payments (Household Debt Service and 
Financial  Obligations  Ratios,”  2013). Second, I used unemployment reported by the 
Census Bureau because academia has largely associated unemployment rates with 
likelihood of default because students have capital constraints (Woo, 2002). FOR Ratio 
and unemployment rates over time is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. 
 
Figure 8 FOR Ratio from 1987-2011 
 
Note: Adapted from “Household Debt Service and Financial Obligations Ratios, 2013.” 
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Figure 9 Unemployment Rate from 1987-2011 
 
Note: Adapted from “US Census Bureau Data, 2010.” 
 
Limitations 
There are three possible limitations to my study that could influence the results. 
The first limitation is that I narrowed the definition of a higher education institution to 
only not-for profit institutions. Knowing this, I will be aware of participant biases 
because of potential differing behaviors between students who attend for-profit higher 
education institutions and students who attend not-for-profit institutions. However, 
because it is a small portion of the post-secondary student population, I believe the 
randomization  of  NCES’s  study  will still yield a normally distributed data sample. 
The second limitation is the focus on default rates rather than delinquency rates. 
The ASA asserts that two-year cohort default rates tell an incomplete story of student 
repayment struggles. Instead, the ASA recommends monitoring delinquency rates. While 
delinquency rates showcases intermediate problems students have with debt burdens, 
currently, there is not enough publicly accessible data to conduct a sophisticated study 
Undergraduate student loans: Loan allocation and repayment struggles 
41 
 
using delinquency rates. However, only a fraction of students who become delinquent on 
their loan enter default, which has greater implications on the student and society 
(“Student  Loan  Guide,”  2014). 
The third, and most important, limitation is the aggregate problem which stems 
from the nature of the study. Because ED prohibits access to individual data, I use 
aggregate data that assumes individuals within the aggregated population assume similar 
behaviors. While the study divides the student aid population into aid and grant recipients 
as well as by institution type, individual recipient characteristics still persist. However, 
the study can fulfill its purpose and claim market trends by using aggregated information. 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
There are multiple steps in determining the relationship between cohort default 
rates, program loan limits, and other independent variables for public and private schools.  
First, to evaluate significance of the regression models, I consider the 
Significance F-statistic which codifies the significance level of the model. The 
Significance F-statistic measures whether variation in one of the independent variables 
can explain the variation in cohort default rates. In other words, the statistic tests the 
prediction of whether all of the slope coefficients are zero, called the null hypothesis, H0. 
While testing the null hypothesis, I also test the alternative hypothesis, H1, the prediction 
that at least one of the slope coefficients is not zero. The Significance F-statistic is 
measured against a significance level of 5%.  
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Then, I analyze the significance of each regression coefficient to determine if the 
predictor variable coefficient has a significant impact on cohort default rates. The 
regression coefficient describes the direction that the independent variable drives the 
dependent variable. For the coefficient to be statistically significant, I compare the 
coefficient’s  probability  of  not  occurring  to  a  significance  level  of  5%.  This  means  that  
the coefficient is significant if the p-value is less than 5%. Hence, the p-value tests the 
prediction of whether the coefficient is unlikely related to the dependent variable, called 
the null hypothesis, H0, or whether the coefficient is likely to impact the dependent 
variable, the alternative hypothesis, H1.  
This section reports results from the public and private regression models. In both 
the public and private school models, I assessed model significance, predictor variable 
coefficient significance, and scale of significant coefficients to answer the key questions. 
 
Public School Model 
Significance of Model 
The public school regression model considers the following null and alternative 
hypothesis: 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠ᇱ𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑠  𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑡𝑜  0     
𝐻ଵ = 𝑎𝑡  𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝑜𝑛𝑒  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒′𝑠  𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒  𝑖𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑡𝑜  0     
 
The F-statistic of the public regression model is 1.921 E-11 which is less than the 
significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that all public school variables in 
the model have a slope equal to zero and accept the alternative hypothesis that at least 
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one  public  school  variable’s  slope  is  not  equal  to  zero.  Thus,  at  least  one  variable  in  the  
model drives public school two-year cohort default rates. 
Program Loan Limits 
The program loan limits variable coefficient considers the following null and 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻ଵ = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the program loan limit coefficient is 1.00 E-02 which is less than 
the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that program loan limits do 
not drive two-year cohort default for public school students and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that program loan limits drive two-year cohort default rates for public school 
students. 
 
Percentage of Public School Loan Recipients 
The percentage of public school  loan  recipients’  variable  coefficient  considers  the  
following null and alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
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𝐻ଵ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the program loan limit coefficient is 2.861 E-06 which is less than 
the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that percentage of public 
school loan recipients does not drive two-year cohort default rates for public school 
students and accept the alternative hypothesis that percentage of public school loan 
recipients drive two-year cohort default rates for public school students. 
 
Percentage of Public School Grant and State Aid Recipients 
The  percentage  of  public  school  grant  and  state  aid  recipients’  variable  coefficient  
considers the following null and alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑎𝑖𝑑  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
𝐻ଵ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑎𝑖𝑑  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the program loan limit coefficient is 2.241 E-04 which is less than 
the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that percentage of public 
school grant and state aid recipients does not drive two-year cohort default rates for 
public school students and accept the alternative hypothesis that percentage of public 
school grant and state aid recipients drive two-year cohort default rates for public school 
students. 




Financial Obligations Ratio (FOR) 
The financial obligations ratio variable coefficient considers the following null 
and alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜    𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
𝐻ଵ = 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜    𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the financial obligations ratio coefficient is 2.702 E-02 which is 
less than the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that financial 
obligations ratios do not drive two-year cohort default rates for public school students 
and accept the alternative hypothesis that financial obligations ratios drive two-year 
cohort default rates for public school students. 
 
Unemployment Rates 
The unemployment rate variable coefficient considers the following null and 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻ଵ = 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠    𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 




The p-value of the unemployment rate coefficient is 2.798 E -01 which is greater 
than the significance level of 5%. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that unemployment 
rates do not drive two-year cohort default rates for public school students. By definition, I 
cannot accept the null. 
 
Sign of Independent Variable Coefficients 
 The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the public school two-year cohort 
default rate is positively affected, through a positive coefficient, or negatively affected, 
through a negative coefficient. Thus, as shown in Table 4.1. an increase in program loan 
limits or unemployment rates result in an increase in public school two-year cohort 
default rates, although it is not a significant driver. Conversely, the increase in the 
percentage of public school loan recipients, percentage of grant and state aid recipients, 
and FOR ratio results in a decrease in public school two-year cohort default rates. 
 
Table 4.1 
Coefficients and Significance Levels and of Independent Variables in Public School Model  
 
 
The Private School Model 
Significance of Model 
Independent Variables Coefficients P-value
Program Loan Limits 2.17E-06 9.99E-03
Percentage of Public School Loan Recipients -3.13E-01 3.74E-06
Percentage of Public Pell Grant and State Aid Recipients -1.64E-01 2.27E-04
FOR Ratio -1.88E-03 2.70E-02
Unemployment Rate 3.17E-01 2.80E-01
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The private school regression model considers the following null and alternative 
hypothesis: 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠ᇱ𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑠  𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑡𝑜  0     
𝐻ଵ = 𝑎𝑡  𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝑜𝑛𝑒  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠ᇱ𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒  𝑖𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑡𝑜  0     
 
The F-statistic of the private school regression model is 2.415 E-05 which is less 
than the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that all private school 
variables in the model have a slope equal to zero and accept the alternative hypothesis 
that at least one private school slope is not equal to zero. Thus, at least one variable in the 
model drives private school two-year cohort default rates. 
 
Significance of Variable Coefficients 
Program Loan Limits 
The program loan limits variable coefficient considers the following null and 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻ଵ = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the program loan limit coefficient is 1.050 E-01 which is greater 
than the significance level of 5%. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that program loan 
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limits do not drive two-year cohort default rates for private school students. By 
definition, I cannot accept the null.  
 
Percentage of Private School Loan Recipients 
The  percentage  of  private  school  loan  recipients’  variable  coefficient considers 
the following null and alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
𝐻ଵ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the program loan limit coefficient is 2.385 E-02 which is less than 
the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that the percentage of private 
school loan recipients does not drive two-year cohort default rates for private school 
students and accept the alternative hypothesis that the percentage of private school loan 
recipients drives two-year cohort default rates for private school students. 
 
Percentage of Private School Grant and State Aid Recipients 
The percentage of private school grant and state aid recipients’ variable 
coefficient considers the following null and alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑎𝑖𝑑  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
Undergraduate student loans: Loan allocation and repayment struggles 
49 
 
𝐻ଵ = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑎𝑖𝑑  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the private school grant and state aid recipients is 9.837 E-03 
which is less than the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that the 
percentage of private school grant and state aid recipients does not drive two-year cohort 
default rates for private school students and accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
percentage of private school grant and state aid recipients drive two-year cohort default 




Financial Obligations Ratio (FOR) 
The financial obligations ratio variable coefficient considers the following null 
and alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜    𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
𝐻ଵ = 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜    𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the financial obligations ratio coefficient is 6.707 E -04 which is 
less than the significance level of 5%. I can reject the null hypothesis that financial 
obligations ratios do not drive two-year cohort default rates for private school students 
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and accept the alternative hypothesis that financial obligations ratios drive two-year 
cohort default rates for private school students. 
 
Unemployment Rates 
The unemployment rate variable coefficient considers the following null and 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
𝐻௢ = 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑑𝑜  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻ଵ = 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠    𝑑𝑜    𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑡𝑤𝑜
− 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The p-value of the unemployment rate coefficient is 1.574 E -01 which is greater 
than the significance level of 5%. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that unemployment 
rates do not drive two-year cohort default rates for public school students. By definition, I 
cannot accept the null. 
 
Sign of Independent Variable Coefficients 
 The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the private school two-year cohort 
default rate is positively affected, through a positive coefficient, or negatively affected, 
through a negative coefficient. Identically to the public school coefficient signs, shown in 
Table 4.2., as program loan limits or unemployment rates increase, private school two-
year cohort default rates increase, although neither is a significant driver. Additionally, 
when the percentage of private school loan recipients, the percentage of grant and state 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ITERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS 
 The  study  found  institutional  drivers  that  influence  students’  ability  to  repay  loans  
in the absence of individual student data. The significance and signs of the coefficients 
help answer the key questions posed in the study. In this section, I answer the questions 
based on findings and provide justification for answers. 
 
Question 1: To what extent does federal loan allocation impact student default rates? 
 The study measured loan allocation through student loan program rates 
established by Congress and provided by postsecondary institutions. In the study, public 
and private school default rates are positively correlated with program loan limits, 
meaning when Congress increases program loan limits, both public and private school 
students are more likely to struggle to payback their debt. The study, affirms the position 
Independent Variables Coefficients P-value
Program Loan Limits 1.12E-06 1.06E-01
Percentage Private Loan Recipients -1.26E-01 2.38E-02
Percentage Private Pell Grant and State Aid Recipients -2.99E-01 9.84E-03
FOR Ratio -3.32E-03 6.71E-04
Unemployment Rate 4.09E-01 1.57E-01
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of loan limit skeptics Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2012); Choy and Li (2006); and 
Hansen and Rhodes (1988) and perpetuates the notion that increasing access to student 
loans by means of loan limit increases is likely to lead to default.  
 While both public and private schools program limits have positive coefficients, 
program limits only significantly impact public school default rates. The uniqueness of 
the two institution types explains different outcomes. Namely, public schools receive 
three times the amount of federal aid funding than private schools. By having more 
capital to give, public schools have a larger percentage of students relying on federal 
student loans (Grinder & Kelly-Reid, 2013). Also, private school students are more likely 
to have financially supportive parents who help smooth the repayment process or take on 
PLUS loans for their children. Lastly, private school students, on average, have better 
money management skills (Sallie Mae, 2012). Thus, the characteristics of borrowers from 
different institutions can contribute to the disparity in program loan limit significance for 
public and private schools default rates. That being said, the relationship between 
program loan limits and private school default rates should be considered relevant but not 
material.  
 
Question 2: Is loan allocation or any other institutional factor significant contributors 
to student loan default? 
Different drivers carried the most significance for public school model and private 
school model, shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. For the public school model, the most 
significant variable was the percentage of loan recipients, an inhibitor of default. The 
finding  combats  Hansen’s  and  Rhodes’  warnings  that  increasing  the  loan  pool  increases  
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the  chances  of  subprime  student  investments.  The  finding  does  support  Congress’,  the  
President’s,  and  other  advocates’ push to increase the number of federal student loan 
borrowers.  Increased  borrower’s  negative  impact  on  public  school  default  rates  could  be  
a result of investment diversification. By expanding the number of borrowers, the federal 
government’s  loan  investments transitions from the neediest student borrower, who are 
likely to be affected by similar socioeconomic events, to a range of borrowers, from 
varying backgrounds and characteristics. 
In the private school model, the most significant variable is the Financial 
Obligations Ratio (FOR), an inhibitor of private school default rate. The finding reiterates 
the notion that private school students are more comfortable with handling debt, at least 
as comfortable as the US economy is. Private school students’ debt management can also 
be seen by the lower balance on their credit cards than public school students and are 
more likely to have a zero percent balance.  
 
Other Notable Findings 
Many political influencers and academics pontificate the benefits of Pell grants 
and detriments of high unemployment rates regarding student loan repayments. 
Interestingly, in this study, Pell grants are less significant, and unemployment rates are 
not significant. Since 1965, policy makers and advocacy groups have debated the 
economic and social cost effectiveness of Pell grants (Hillman, 2014). Because of the 
extreme upfront cost of Pell grants, it is harder for budget constrained administrations to 
justify massive Pell grant investment. This study confirms that increasing Pell grant 
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recipients  decreases  both  public  and  private  schools’  default  rate  but  also shows that Pell 
grants are not the only means in reducing students chances of defaulting. 
Tim Woo (2002) aligned much of students repayment struggles to their chances 
for attaining a job. The study confirms the positive relationship between unemployment 
and public/private school default rates but relays that other factors are better to discern 
student payback ability. This could be because attaining higher education at a four-year 
public or non-profit private institution increases students’ chances to get a higher paying 
job (Avery  and  Turner,  2012).  Hence,  with  a  bachelor’s  degree,  students  are  more  
resilient to economic job instability. 
Overall, the study upholds the value of student investment in higher education 
through student loans, irrespective of institution type. Interestingly, it highlights the 
potential of loan program expansion, which can act as a budgetary buffer. However, it 
denounces, the current loan allocation system that relies on periodic increases of program 
maximums, especially for public schools. Thus, as Dynarski and Scott-Clatyon suggested 
in 2012, federal student loan allocation needs to be reformed to better tailor loans to 
individuals or groups of individuals.  
 
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The study found that broadening the reach of federal student loans can decrease 
public and private school default rates. As Congress, the President, and ED look to 
increase the student loan scale, they should strive to simplify the loan allocation process 
and  align  loan  amount  to  the  student’s  educational  needs. 
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In this section, I highlight key alternatives to the current loan allocation process. 
These alternatives are the three largely discussed in popular press, by higher education 
generals, and amongst policy makers and influencers. This section describes and values 
the three alternatives: (1) President  Obama’s  student  loan  revisions,  (2)  Income  Share  
Agreements, and (3) Income-Contingent Loans12.  
 
President  Obama’s  student  loan  revisions 
In an effort to revise the Federal Student Loan Program, Office of the Press 
Secretary shares the President’s  legislation  proposal  which  links  student  aid  allocation  
and college quality. With this ideal, he established two inanities relevant to loan 
allocation: (1) paying for performance and (2) promoting innovation and completion. 
Through the indicatives, he hopes to eliminate the current loan allocation structure and 
provide  higher  education  at  a  better  “bargain”  (Office  of  the  Press  Secretary,  2013).   
 
Paying for Performance 
By 2015, President Obama wants to identify colleges which generate the highest 
return on  a  student’s  investment  in  education  through  a  College  ScoreCard  created  by  the  
ED. The score card determines how much student loan funding a college receives by 
comparing colleges with similar missions, identifying colleges that do the most to help 
students with disadvantaged backgrounds, and recognizing colleges working towards 
performance improvement. The ratings are quantitatively measured based on: 
x College access: percentage of students receiving Pell grants 
                                                          
12 The proposed Income Share Agreement and Income-Contingent loans have similar titles to current loan 
repayment plans but are different plans. 
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x College affordability: college cost of attendance, scholarships, and average loan 
debt 
x College outcomes: graduation rates, graduate earnings, advanced degrees of 
graduates  
Through college ratings, college allocation of debt would be in line with the success of 
the college rather than benchmarking allocations individual and program loan limits. The 
ED would establish loftier loan limits for money management purposes.  
Additionally, to promote student college success and money management, the 
Paying for Performance initiative would require students to complete a certain percentage 
of classes before receiving continued funding. The President hopes to ensure students 
complete college on time and focus loan amounts on educational expenses (Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2013).   
 
Promote Innovation and Competition 
  Along with linking student aid to school performance, President Obama 
also targets the cost of attendance, which has historically driven higher loan limits. Under 
the Promote innovation and competition initiative, the president challenges colleges and 
states to craft innovative ways to learning in college which have lower costs and higher 
success  rates.  As  an  example,  President  Obama  cites  the  University  of  Maryland’s  
redesigned entry level psychology course which increased student passing rates and cut 
costs by 70%. He voices the cost and educational upside to integrating technology into 
students’  lives.  Furthermore,  President Obama hopes to financially encourage colleges 
that work towards innovative education ideas by awarding more Pell grants to colleges 
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that  become  “experimental  sites”.  Overall,  he  aims  to  make  higher  education  a  more  
efficient business where students will have to borrow less and have a higher return on 
investment (Office of the Press Secretary, 2013). 
  
Evaluation of President  Obama’s  Indicatives 
The  president’s  movement  to  better  the  student  loan  program  is  a  needed  
adjustment  but  the  logistic  viability  of  his  plan  is  questionable.  President  Obama’s  
Paying for performance and Promote innovation and competition initiatives are 
necessary to restructure the student loan allocation process and necessary allocation 
amount. As the President envisions, the College ScoreCard promotes transparency 
between potential college students and higher education. To substantiate the initiative, it 
encompasses the recommendations from The Project on Student Debt: (1) reduce 
students’ need to borrow via reducing college costs and (2) provide students with key 
information via the College ScoreCards. More importantly, it shifts aid allocation 
generated  from  program  loan  limits  to  individualized  aid  allocation  based  on  the  college’s  
return on investment. After reading the horror stories of students unknowingly 
overborrowing  and  defaulting  on  student  loans,  President  Obama’s  solution  is  a  step  in  
the right direction.  However, I am concerned that the rating is too subjective and act 
more  as  guides,  like  BusinessWeek’s  top  ranked  business  schools13, especially since the 
ED is considering a range of factors – from comparing college quality to college outreach 
to  disadvantaged  students.  Regardless,  President  Obama’s  focus  on  strengthening  the  US  
higher education and student loan allocation would change the paradigm.  
                                                          
13 Business Week ranks US business schools based on student assessment, employer opinion, median 
salary, undergraduates to MBAs, and academic quality. While many of the variables are quantifiable and 
objective, student assessment can be a bias representation of school quality.  




Income Share Agreements 
The American Enterprise Institution (AEI), right leaning think tank, argues that 
loan limits promote student overborrowing and inflated tuition rates. Instead, AEI 
proposes eliminating loan limits and adapting Income Share Agreements (ISAs). ISAs are 
financial instruments to privately finance higher education where investors provide 
students with financing for higher education in exchange for the students’ future 
earnings. With an ISA, students pay a share of their income for a certain amount of time; 
there is no principle or interest rates. In the agreement, investors evaluate the students’ 
characteristics and set a rate for each college the students consider based on perceived 
return on investment. Investors can then preserve their investment by actively supporting 
students’  higher  education  achievements 
The AEA prefers ISAs because they minimize the downside risk of student 
investment in higher education. Conjunctively, ISAs remove the government from the 
student loan process and personalize loans to the individual, an issue with current loan 
allocation. Similarly to President  Obama’s  initiative,  ISAs  help  channel  students  to  
higher quality programs at a lower cost because they offer better terms to students for 
programs that investors expect to be high value. Their system also signals the value of 
different institutions and programs to students through the differences in income 
percentage they have to repay. 
The AEI recognizes that a full ISA program is unrealistic. However, AEI 
concludes that there should be a hybrid of federal student loans with lowered loan limits 
that encourage alternative financing. Other organizations active in higher education 
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policy, such as the National Center for Policy Analysis14 and the NAF, pontificate the 
potential of ISAs for college financing (Palacios, M., DeSorrento, T., & Kelly, A. P., 
2014).  
  
Evaluation of Income Share Agreements 
The benefit of ISAs is that they make higher education financing student centric 
and remove the politics that impact student loan legislation. Instead of providing aid to 
students by generically fractioning out  loan  amounts,  ISAs  view  student  individuals’  
unique investments, similar to a start-up. Moreover, ISAs equally distribute risk between 
students  and  investors.  Conversely,  while  ISAs  eliminate  student  debt  from  students’  
portfolio, there are three drawbacks. First, an ISA approach to financing will funnel many 
students into monetarily high-quality programs, like computer science, engineering, or 
business administration15. This would result in an oversupply of students in the high-
paying jobs and an undersupply of students in lower-paying but highly-rewarding 
occupations, like education or social work. Second, there is a chance that access to an 
ISA is unattainable for low income students who appear to be riskier investments or are 
priced out of the market because they cannot afford the rate. Third, ISAs are hard to scale 
up nationally on the individual level. While the tiered and population ISA models exist, 
they are burdened with pooling issues that the current student loan program faces. 
Since the establishment of the Higher Education Act, the first objective of federal 
student aid is to assist those with substantial financial need to pursue higher education. 
This segment of the student aid market is more likely to be priced out than middle- and 
                                                          
14 The National Center for Policy Analysis is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization highly 
respected by academia.  
15 The Sallie Mae foundation ranked the three as the most lucrative positions currently. 
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upper-income students because they are more risk adverse to borrowing large amounts of 
money (Hansen & Rhodes, 1988; Avery & Tuner, 2012) and, financially, more risky to 
invest in. Thus, federal government buy in on an ISA-only financial assistance system is 
unlikely. However, ISAs are an ideal avenue for middle- and upper-income students who 
only need to supplement a fraction of their education costs. By targeting middle- and 
upper-income students, ISAs can remain a manageable, size and students who can afford 
to make choices on higher education financing have an additional option. 
 
Income-Contingent Loans 
Congressman Tom Petri first suggested Income Contingent Loans (ICLs) in an 
attempt to simplify student loan allocation and lessen default rates. ICLs set loan limits 
based  on  program  of  study  and  expected  earnings.  Built  from  Milton  Friedman’s  
graduation tax16, income Contingent Loans (ICLs) are advantages because it creates 
default protection and smooth consumption.  
EducationSector, a part of the American Institute for  Research,  expanded  Petri’s  
legislation and recommends an ICL model where the federal government is still issuing 
the  loan,  which  aligns  with  current  policy.  EducationSector’s  ICL  model  is  mirrored  from 
the successful Australian model implemented in 1989. In Australia, the government sets 
loan limits based on the college program. Students then have a choice to pay tuition 
upfront at a discounted percent value price or defer the loan until after graduation. After 
graduation, the student pays off the loan as a percentage of income. This process tailors 
cost  of  attendance  and  loan  payments  to  students’  programs  and  students’  future  earnings,  
                                                          
16 With  Milton  Friedman’s  graduation  tax,  graduates  agreed  to  pay  a  percent  of  their  income  for  a  certain  
length of time. 
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and sets a minimum income level where students do not have to pay. Payments would be 
automatically collected through the tax system, such as Social Security, which would 
remove repayment paperwork.  
EducationSector argues that redesigning loan allocation through ICLs simplify the 
process and match loan aid to projected performance. With this allocation program, 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans would be replaced by one type of loan, an ICL. Hence, 
ICLs  do  not  base  individual’s  loan  limits  on a student’s  family  income  due  to  irrelevance  
once a student has graduated and entered repayment. Nevertheless, ICLs are sensitive to 
college program earning potential and student income variation. Thus, it removes the 
heavy debt burden that young borrowers in repayment feel and promotes them to be 
participating members in the economy, healthily taking on other types of consumer debt 
as investments. 
 
Evaluation of Income Contingent Loans 
Along with Petri and EducationSector, I agree that ICLs are a pragmatic and 
logical means to allocate financial aid. However, I perceive three drawbacks to ICLs. 
First, under ICLs, there is a chance of moral hazard where students avoid higher paying 
jobs and have a lower loan amount. Second, there is a chance for colleges to see ICLs as 
a reason to increase the cost of attendance and decrease grant aid which would cause 
more students to be reliant on larger loans. Third, ICLs do not consider loan distribution 
on an individual level, allowing two students with varying levels of socioeconomic 
standing to receive the same loan amount because there is no program and individual loan 
limit system. 
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However, ICLs are a rational way to adapt an international model to the US 
federal student loan program. Academia reports that student confusion increases chances 
of default because they are unaware of how to equate individual and program maximum 
limits to the amount of debt they can manage (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2012). ICLs 
simplify the student loan program and directly connect students’ investment in higher 
education to their future occupations. 
 
Resolution of Alternatives 
Overall, loan allocation is not an easy problem to solve. There are many 
stakeholders involved with varying degrees of risk appetites, from risk-junky investors to 
risk-adverse students. Ideally, a hybrid of the three loan allocation alternatives would be 
optimal.  Ideologically,  President  Obama’s  desire to match financial aid to education 
quality is needed to generate higher returns on financial aid programs. Creatively, ISAs 
are an innovative method of financing college education that would better serve middle- 
and upper-class students than the current student loan structure. Structurally, ICLs 
encourage students to invest in education linked to the pursuit of high-quality 
occupations. 
Realistically, ICLs have the greatest upside potential for a national-scale student 
loan reform. The program transfers  student  loan  allocation  from  considering  a  student’s  
financial  history  to  a  student’s  financial  future.  ICLs  accomplish  the  goals  the  study  
suggest: (1) encourages students to take on loans because they better understand loan 
pricing and payback up front and (2) protects students from over borrowing by assessing 
monetary return on education. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 Student loan allocation research has gained momentum in the last 10 years, largely 
pioneered by Susan Dynarki and Judith Scott-Clayton’s  comments on the inefficiency of current 
student loan allocation in 2006. Their publication forced Congress and the executive branch to 
start reconsidering the student loan process initiated 40 years prior. With that has come an influx 
of loan reforms that attempt to adapt the Higher Education Act to the higher education landscape 
of the 21st century. 
 This study aims to determine productivity of the current loan allocation process by 
considering educational and economic institutional variables that research suggests drive student 
loan default rates. The study suggested that current student loan allocation is ineffective for 
program limits did not subdue student default rates. However, the study also revealed that federal 
loan expansion lowers default rates. Hence, there is a chance for the federal government to 
change student loan policy by expanding the number of student loan recipients. These findings 
should motivate policy makers to reform the federal student loan program by expanding its reach 
but placing better limitations on the amount an individual can borrow.  
As President Obama pushes higher education reform, a potential student loan reform 
program  is  based  on  Australia’s  Income-Contingent Loan program. The program allocates loans 
based  on  students’  intended  field  of  study  which  they  pay  back  as  a  percentage  of  income  after  
graduation.  ICLs  have  a  similar  structure  to  the  U.S.’s  current federal student loan program, but 
consider  students  potential  earning  rather  than  arbitrarily  deciding  a  student’s  neediness. 
Regardless, with any new loan allocation method, the government should consider its 
role. Currently, the government guarantees loans and the subsidy distorts the market. Colleges 
feel free to over-inflate COA and lenders have little incentive to lend wisely. Then borrowing 
amounts largely depend on 18-year-old students who have very little past experience with any 
debt instrument. Hence, in some capacity, the student loan allocation system needs to be 
Undergraduate student loans: Loan allocation and repayment struggles 
64 
 
reworked. If the government does not limit potential borrowers’ level of decision making through 
ICLs (or a similar type program), then they should determine ways to effectively educate 
potential borrowers on future implications of loan size in relation to future income. There is a 
third option: remove most government subsidies for higher education, except for the neediest 
borrowers, and place higher education financing responsibility to the private sector which is 
familiar with uncollateralized loans. 
 
Personal Reflection  
Lastly, as I worked through the study, it was interesting to see the roadblocks of 
collecting meaningful data. Ultimately, the study wanted to find a linkage through political 
policy, namely student loan limit polity, and student loan default. Because of data blockage, it 
was difficult for me to attain information which could lead to substantially impactful solutions. 
Specifically, colleges and the ED lock individual-specific data forcing me to have to aggregate up 
to institution type. After calling financial aid offices at various institutions in addition to 
government departments, I realized that it currently was impossible to attain records of students 
on an individual or college level. The NCES and Project on Student Debt report certain 
information on the state level not all variables were broken down enough to run a regression. In a 
perfect experiment, I would have at least been able to break down information by independent 
and dependent students as well. The lack of good data caused me to echo others that policy 
around availability of education data should be released. This way academics conducting similar 
studies as mine can eliminate some of the aggregate data problem that I encountered.
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Year 2-year Cohort Default Rate
Program 
Loan Limit
% Public Loan 
Recipients
% Public Pell Grant 
and State Aid 
Recipients
FOR Ratio Unemployment Rate
1987 14%  $     17,250 30% 37% 69.77 6%
1988 15%         17,250 29% 42% 68.20 5%
1989 14%         17,250 29% 43% 67.92 5%
1990 13%         17,250 29% 44% 67.73 6%
1991 12%         17,250 30% 50% 67.13 7%
1992 13%         17,250 33% 55% 63.82 7%
1993 12%         23,000 36% 54% 62.68 7%
1994 12%         30,684 41% 54% 63.48 6%
1995 11%         30,684 47% 54% 65.83 6%
1996 10%         30,478 48% 55% 66.52 5%
1997 9%         30,314 49% 56% 66.60 5%
1998 8%         30,234 49% 57% 65.38 5%
1999 7%         30,003 50% 54% 66.53 4%
2000 7%         29,863 51% 55% 67.18 4%
2001 6%         29,742 51% 60% 69.68 5%
2002 6%         29,709 51% 63% 69.26 6%
2003 5%         29,682 53% 65% 67.91 6%
2004 5%         29,639 53% 65% 67.23 6%
2005 5%         29,526 53% 62% 68.94 5%
2006 6%         29,528 53% 60% 69.70 5%
2007 7%         29,581 53% 61% 71.60 5%
2008 7%         33,929 48% 64% 70.83 6%
2009 7%         33,849 43% 80% 69.58 9%
2010 8%         33,956 40% 92% 65.56 10%
2011 10%         33,988 35% 93% 63.01 9%
Educational Drivers Economic Divers
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% Public Loan 
Recipients
% Public Pell Grant and 




% Public Loan Recipents 0.760 1
% Public Pell Grant and 
State Aid Recipients 0.734 0.296 1
FOR Ratio 0.029 0.311 -0.152 1
Unemployment Rate 0.079 -0.450 0.633 -0.350 1
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 2.32E-02 4.64E-03 6.77E+01 1.92E-11
Residual 19 1.30E-03 6.86E-05
Total 24 2.45E-02
Independent Variables Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Program Loan Limits 2.17E-06 7.59E-07 2.86E+00 9.99E-03 5.83E-07 3.76E-06
Percentage of Public School Loan Recipients -3.13E-01 4.88E-02 -6.42E+00 3.74E-06 -4.15E-01 -2.11E-01
Percentage of Public Pell Grant and State Aid Recipients -1.64E-01 3.62E-02 -4.53E+00 2.27E-04 -2.40E-01 -8.84E-02
FOR Ratio -1.88E-03 7.85E-04 -2.40E+00 2.70E-02 -3.52E-03 -2.38E-04
Unemployment Rate 3.17E-01 2.85E-01 1.11E+00 2.80E-01 -2.79E-01 9.13E-01
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% Private Loan 
Recipients
% Private Pell Grant 
and State Aid 
Recipients
FOR Ratio Unemployment Rate
1987 5%  $     17,250 41% 28% 69.77 6%
1988 6%         17,250 40% 31% 68.2 5%
1989 5%         17,250 39% 31% 67.92 5%
1990 6%         17,250 41% 31% 67.73 6%
1991 6%         17,250 41% 34% 67.13 7%
1992 7%         17,250 42% 35% 63.82 7%
1993 7%         23,000 47% 34% 62.68 7%
1994 7%         30,684 52% 33% 63.48 6%
1995 7%         30,684 56% 32% 65.83 6%
1996 6%         30,478 57% 32% 66.52 5%
1997 6%         30,314 58% 32% 66.6 5%
1998 5%         30,234 59% 33% 65.38 5%
1999 4%         30,003 60% 31% 66.53 4%
2000 4%         29,863 61% 31% 67.18 4%
2001 4%         29,742 61% 33% 69.68 5%
2002 4%         29,709 62% 34% 69.26 6%
2003 3%         29,682 62% 35% 67.91 6%
2004 3%         29,639 62% 35% 67.23 6%
2005 2%         29,526 62% 33% 68.94 5%
2006 3%         29,528 62% 32% 69.7 5%
2007 4%         29,581 62% 33% 71.6 5%
2008 4%         33,929 57% 33% 70.83 6%
2009 5%         33,849 53% 39% 69.58 9%
2010 5%         33,956 50% 45% 65.56 10%
2011 5%         33,988 45% 45% 63.01 9%
Economic VariablesEducational Factors
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% Private Loan 
Recipients
% Private Pell Grant and 




% Private Loan Recipients 0.756 1
% Private Pell Grant and 
State Aid Recipients 0.439 -0.073 1
FOR Ratio 0.029 0.321 -0.374 1
Unemployment Rate 0.079 -0.455 0.458 -0.350 1
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 0.004041266 0.000808253 12.00460634 2.41542E-05
Residual 19 0.001279243 6.73286E-05
Total 24 0.005320509
Independent Variables Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Program Loan Limits 1.11576E-06 6.56803E-07 1.698770733 0.105678429 -2.58947E-07 2.49046E-06
Percentage of Private School Loan Recipients -1.264E-01 0.051473931 -2.456013261 0.023846447 -0.234156834 -0.018684481
Percentage of Private Pell Grant and State Aid Recipients -2.987E-01 0.104142148 -2.868439849 0.009836914 -0.51669751 -0.080753467
FOR Ratio -3.316E-03 0.000817025 -4.058284111 0.00067069 -0.005025775 -0.001605667
Unemployment Rate 0.408909345 0.277824994 1.471823462 0.157439235 -0.172585051 0.990403742
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